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To Win Friends and Influence
People: Regulation and Enforcement
of Influencer Marketing After Ten
Years of the Endorsement Guides
Craig C. Carpenter & Mark Bonin II*
ABSTRACT
For the last ten years, social media influencer marketing has been
regulated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under the FTC’s
Section 5 “unfair practices” authority, guided by the Endorsement
Guides, a “best practices” document published by the FTC. This is
a fairly “light” regulatory scheme where violators typically enter
no-money, no-fault consent decrees and generally undertake to do a
better job following the Endorsement Guides in the future. During
this time, the practice has flourished, and companies are spending
significant portions of their marketing budgets on social media
influencer advertising. Recently, the FTC has submitted proposals for
increased enforcement and penalties in this space based on a belief that
misinformation is plaguing the internet.
This Article reviews the history of influencer marketing and
examines the current regulatory regime. This Article contends that the
current regime, while not perfect, is preferable to a strict rule-based
approach with substantial penalties due to the evolving nature of social
media and consumer perception in this area.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“In the future, everyone will be world-famous for 15 minutes.”
–Andy Warhol1

Social media has forever changed digital advertising. Because
people are spending less and less time watching live television and
reading print media in favor of spending more time on their
smartphones, brands have been forced to find new ways to connect with
consumers. To do this, brands frequently turn to individual social
media users who can push brand messaging to their followers.
Typically, influencer-sponsored brand messages are more authentic
than traditional advertising because they connect with targeted
demographics on a more personal level.
Increased brand interest in influencer marketing is also creating
a viable occupation for entrepreneurial millennials and zoomers. Gone
are the days when only celebrities and professional athletes received
endorsement deals. Boosted by influencer platforms like RewardStyle2
and influencer agencies like the Influencer Marketing Agency3
and Viral Nation,4 otherwise “regular” people can use social media
1.
Quote widely attributed to Andy Warhol. See, e.g., Tony Bravo, ‘World-famous for 15
minutes’: How Andy Warhol Predicted the Cult of Personality and Social Media Age, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE DATEBOOK (May 13, 2019), https://datebook.sfchronicle.com/art-exhibits/world-famous-for-15-minutes-how-andy-warhol-predicted-the-social-media-age-and-cult-ofpersonality (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
2.
REWARDSTYLE, https://rewardstyle.com/ [https://perma.cc/22YP-JETP] (last visited
Dec. 4, 2020). RewardStyle is a Dallas-based company that aids influencers in managing and
monetizing content. See id.
3.
INFLUENCER MKTG. AGENCY, https://imagency.com/about [https://perma.cc/82DQ2PJV] (last visited Dec. 4, 2020).
4.
VIRAL NATION, https://viralnation.com/ [https://perma.cc/CB4Z-Y5F6] (last visited
Dec. 4, 2020); see Chavie Lieber, How and Why Do Influencers Make So Much Money? The Head of
an Influencer Agency Explains, VOX (Nov. 28, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-
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platforms to fund their creative endeavors and earn income. While
not all social media users have the voice or reach to lure brand
sponsorships, even social media users who have just a few thousand
followers5—a relatively small audience by industry standards—can
turn their platforms into lucrative brand partnerships by leveraging a
particular type of content or audience of followers.6
In 2009, influencer marketing was fringe enough to avoid heavy
legal scrutiny. As a result, the practice proliferated. When used
appropriately, the benefits were three-fold: (1) brands were able to
connect targeted content with the desired demographic; (2) digital
entrepreneurs were able to fund content and creativity; and
(3) consumers received more information on products and brands that
might be of interest. As this practice grew in prominence, however, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) took notice.7
As the primary US regulator of advertising practices, the FTC’s
foray into social media marketing was inevitable. Over the last few
years, the FTC has provided numerous guidance documents on this
subject, including seminal guidance in the Guides Concerning the Use
of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (Endorsement
Guides).8 Fortunately for brands and influencers, the Endorsement
Guides are not binding law. Consequently, the FTC’s enforcement
authority and available penalties9 for first-time offenders are
goods/2018/11/28/18116875/influencer-marketing-social-media-engagement-instagram-youtube
[https://perma.cc/C92G-3M5Z].
5.
See Kaya Ismail, Social Media Influencers: Mega, Macro, Micro or Nano,
CMSWIRE (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.cmswire.com/digital-marketing/social-media-influencersmega-macro-micro-or-nano/ [https://perma.cc/6CX6-3PHR]. Individuals that possess between one
thousand to one hundred thousand followers or subscribers and are typically regarded as experts
in their respective niches are often titled “Micro Influencers.” Id.
6.
See Barrett Wissman, Micro-Influencers: The Marketing Force of the Future?, FORBES
(Mar. 2, 2018, 9:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/barrettwissman/2018/03/02/micro-influencers-the-marketing-force-of-the-future/#52e10df86707
[https://perma.cc/5SEX-G63X];
Danny
Parisi, 11 Honoré Embraces Micro-Influencers, GLOSSY (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.glossy.co/
fashion/amid-budget-cuts-11-honore-embraces-micro-influencers [https://perma.cc/Q69G-3CLH].
7.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMM’N FILE NO. P204500, STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER
ROHIT CHOPRA REGARDING THE ENDORSEMENT GUIDES REVIEW 2–3 (2020), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_statements/1566445/p204500_-_endorsement_guides_reg_review_-_chopra_stmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W58-Y8SK].
8.
FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising,
16 C.F.R. § 255 (2020).
9.
Advertisement Endorsements, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/media-resources/truth-advertising/advertisement-endorsements
[https://perma.cc/6833U5M8] (last visited Dec. 4, 2020) (“there are no civil penalties associated with [the endorsement
guides]. But if advertisers don’t follow the guides, the FTC may decide to investigate whether the
practices are unfair or deceptive under the FTC Act.”); A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade
Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N
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minimal.10 Although the Endorsement Guides lack the punitive punch
of other FTC enforcement subjects,11 these Guides are pivotal given the
need for flexibility vis-à-vis ever-changing technology.
Recently, despite brands’ and influencers’ growing comfort and
understanding of the existing regulatory framework, the FTC abruptly
sought to change the rules of the game and raise the stakes. On
February 12, 2020, the FTC requested comments to a proposal that
enhances its enforcement authority over influencer marketing and
increases the penalties.12 This proposal was accompanied by a
statement from FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra that was highly
critical of the current influencer marketing enforcement regimes.13
Chopra argues that “[f]ake accounts, fake likes, fake followers, and fake
reviews are now polluting the digital economy, making it difficult for
families and small businesses looking for truthful information.”14 The
request for comments to the proposal was unanimously approved by the
FTC.15 One of the primary goals of the proposal is to “determine
whether to create new requirements for social media platforms and
advertisers and whether to activate civil penalty liability,”16 essentially
seeking to end the light-handed regulatory approach that has governed
under the Endorsement Guides.
This Article examines the proliferation of social media
influencer marketing and the FTC’s response. Instead of increasing
regulation and penalties, as proposed in the FTC’s February 12, 2020,
proposal and statement, this Article suggests that the risk of social
media influencer marketing misleading or deceiving consumers is
minimal and generally outweighed by the benefits of the practice as a
(Oct. 2019) [hereinafter FTC Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority],
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/7SGD-Y5ZS].
10.
Cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A), 53, 57(b) (authorizing the FTC to commence civil suits
for unfair methods of competition, false advertising, and deceptive acts).
11.
See The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/ftcs-endorsement-guides-what-peopleare-asking [https://perma.cc/SGU9-UZEJ] (last updated Aug. 27, 2020); Enforcement, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement [https://perma.cc/2FTK-YKS6] (last visited Dec. 4, 2020)
(“The FTC administers a wide variety of laws and regulations, including the Federal Trade
Commission Act, Telemarketing Sale Rule, Identity Theft Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, and
Clayton Act. In total, the Commission has enforcement or administrative responsibilities under
more than 70 laws.”).
12.
FTC Seeks Public Comment on Its Endorsement Guides, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 12,
2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/02/ftc-seeks-public-comment-its-endorsement-guides [https://perma.cc/2MYY-EFUR].
13.
Id.; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 1.
14.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 2.
15.
FTC Seeks Public Comment on Its Endorsement Guides, supra note 12.
16.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 1.
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whole. This Article also suggests that the technology employed by these
influencers fluctuates too often to be governed by a rigid, binding legal
framework with harsh penalties for noncompliance. As a result, a
lighter regulatory approach from the FTC is warranted.
II. RISE OF THE INFLUENCERS
If you could turn your social media use into $40,000–$100,000
annually, would you be interested?17 Sure, it would take some work to
build up a following, but with around ten to fifty thousand followers,
this kind of money would not be unrealistic.18 With these numbers, it is
no wonder that influencer marketing has “turned into a bona fide career
path.”19 In today’s lexicon, “influencers” are consumers who promote
products to their followers on social media.20 However, the concept of
“influencer marketing” has been around as long as there have been
celebrities and athletes willing to push products to their fans. In fact,
most of the laws that are applicable to this practice were created for
television, radio, and print endorsements.21 As consumer media
consumption has changed, television, radio, and print endorsements
have lost some of their effectiveness, and brands have looked for
ways to connect with an increasingly distracted audience. Rather than
watching live network television and the corresponding commercials,
consumers are now primarily consuming content from their phones.22
This makes it more difficult for brands to reach consumers through
traditional media.23 Brands needed a way to get commercial messages
to consumers where they were spending most of their time, namely on
social media.24 Thus, influencer marketing, as we know it today, was
17.
See Lieber, supra note 4 (“People with smaller followings [who are known as
nanoinfluencers] can make between $30,000 and $60,000 a year. The micro-influencers can make
anywhere from $40,000 to $100,000. Celeb influencers make way, way more.”).
18.
See id.
19.
See id.
20.
See Dianne Esber & Jane Wong, Discussions in Digital: Influencer Marketing Is Ready
for Its Close-Up, MCKINSEY & CO . (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.Mckinsey.Com/Business-Functions/Marketing-And-Sales/Our-Insights/Discussions-In-Digital-Influencer-Marketing-Is-ReadyFor-Its-Close-Up [https://perma.cc/BJ26-FHDD].
21.
See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Endorsements and Testimonials
Guide, Address at the American Conference Institute’s Regulatory Summit for Advertisers and
Marketers (June 25, 2009); FTC Seeks Public Comment on Its Endorsement Guides, supra note 12.
22.
See Giselle Abramovich, 4 Consumer Trends That Are Revolutionizing Content
Consumption, ADOBE BLOG (Sept. 7, 2017), https://cmo.adobe.com/articles/2017/9/media-and-entertainment-study-on-consumer-behavior-adi-.html#gs.e4h8hd
[https://perma.cc/FB8C-9J4K?
type=image].
23.
See id.
24.
See id.
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born. Influencer marketing began to evolve with the advent of social
media. Suddenly, people who were “famous for nothing”25 could earn
thousands of dollars for posting about products on their social media
pages,26 and popular teenage social media influencers are starring in
Super Bowl ads.27
These days, companies spend significant percentages of their
annual advertising budgets on influencer marketing. Indeed, it is
estimated that brands will spend $15 billion by 2022 on influencer
marketing.28 Pre-Pandemic estimates for 2020 forecasted the online
advertising market to be upwards of $2.5 billion on Instagram
alone.29 Brands experienced equally impressive results from influencer
marketing—one study of European consumers across thirty product
areas and more than one hundred brands found that, in 2014, social
media recommendations induced an average of 26 percent of all
purchases.30 That figure was up 10 percent from the previous year.31
As with all types of advertising, the COVID-19 Pandemic has
impacted influencer marketing; however, influencer marketing has
shown to be one of the more resilient forms of advertising during the
Pandemic.32 While influencer marketing spend is predicted to be down

25.
See Sheila Marikar, Top 5 Celebrities Famous for . . . Nothing, ABC NEWS (June 5,
2009, 7:13 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/CelebrityCafe/story?id=7762876&page=1
[https://perma.cc/U4N7-TUNF].
26.
See Seamus Kirst, The Kardashian’s Social Media Influence, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2015,
6:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/seamuskirst/2015/12/17/the-kardashians-social-media-influence/#2eadcec61f03 [https://perma.cc/RA3C-QNJ5]; Erica Gonzales, Kris Jenner Reveals How
Much Her Famous Daughters Get Paid for Sponsored Instagram Posts, HARPER’S BAZAAR (Apr. 17,
2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.harpersbazaar.com/celebrity/latest/a27171148/kardashian-familypay-sponspored-instagram-post/ [https://perma.cc/3SKU-V9XN].
27.
See Kat Tenbarge, Inside the Life of 15-Year-Old Charli D’Amelio, the Most Popular
Teen on the Internet Who Became the Top TikToker for Her Viral Dances and Hype House
Membership, INSIDER (Mar. 25, 2020, 10:54 AM), https://www.insider.com/charli-d-amelio-biohow-old-tiktok-famous-renegade-super-bowl-2020 [https://perma.cc/QPX2-UTDR].
28.
Audrey Schomer, Influencer Marketing: State of the Social Media Influencer Market
in 2020, BUS . INSIDER (Dec. 17, 2019, 2:07 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/influencer-marketing-report [https://perma.cc/ZQP9-YYEG].
29.
Paolo Zialcita, FTC Issues Rules for Disclosure of Ads by Social Media Influencers,
NPR (Nov. 5, 2019, 4:57 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/05/776488326/ftc-issues-rules-for-disclosure-of-ads-by-social-media-influencers [https://perma.cc/FC7J-VWCJ].
30.
Jacques Bughin, Getting a Sharper Picture of Social Media’s Influence,
MCKINSEY & CO.: MCKINSEY Q. (July 1, 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/marketing-and-sales/our-insights/getting-a-sharper-picture-of-social-medias-influence
[https://perma.cc/JXZ5-B4FE].
31.
Id.
32.
Ryan Skinner, How Has the Pandemic Impacted Influencer Marketing?, FORRESTER
(July
23,
2020), https://go.forrester.com/blogs/how-has-the-pandemic-impacted-influencermarketing/ [https://perma.cc/6F4M-AW2R]; SHAR VANBOSKIRK, TINA MOFFETT, RICK
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by as much as 20 percent from the previous year as marketing budgets
are adjusted for changed economics and consumer behavior during
a pandemic, many businesses see opportunity in social media
marketing.33 This is especially true as traditional avenues of producing
content (TV, print, movies) dry up due to (a) the challenge in developing
large-scale productions during a pandemic and (b) consumers being
largely confined to their homes.34 During a pandemic, it is much easier
and safer for influencers to prepare content in their homes with
their smartphones than for a company to attempt to produce a TV
commercial with multiple actors and large crews. Additionally, studies
show that consumers are spending more time on social media during
the Pandemic.35 Because of these factors, social media advertising may
end up being the marketing sector least impacted by the Pandemic.36
Influencer marketing is also enticing to companies because
social media allows brands to more easily calculate a campaign’s return
on investment (ROI). Clicks, views, and conversions can be viewed
and interpreted in near real time. This data is critical for brands to both
understand their customers and develop content and campaigns that
are relevant to such customers. If influencers can reach an appropriate
balance between paid content and personal content, their income (and
influence) will grow with their audience.37 Compared to traditional
avenues of paid endorsement work (i.e., becoming a movie star or
professional athlete), social media endorsement work has a much lower
barrier of entry thanks to free-to-sign-up social media profiles, easy
content creation from smart devices, provable ROI and audience, and

PARRISH & BRANDON VERBLOW, FORRESTER, THE 2020 COVID-19 CRISIS WILL STUN US
MARKETING 6 (2020).
33.
Skinner, supra note 32; see also Thomas Seal, Barilla Pays Influencers to Peddle Pasta
Because No One’s Making TV Ads, BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-30/barilla-pays-influencers-to-peddle-pasta-because-no-one-smaking-tv-ads [https://perma.cc/F5E6-AZJT].
34.
Skinner, supra note 32; see Seal, supra note 33.
35.
See REED SMITH, AN ANA AND REED SMITH LEGAL GUIDE: THE IMPACT OF COVID-19
ON BRAND ADVERTISING AND MARKETING 9 (2d ed. 2020), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2020/04/an-ana-and-reed-smith-legal-guide-the-impact-of-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/BH76TQGM].
36.
See Skinner, supra note 32; REED SMITH, supra note 35.
37.
Sujan Patel, How You Can Build a Powerful Influencer Marketing Strategy in
2020, BIGC OMMERCE, https://www.bigcommerce.com/blog/influencer-marketing/#executive-summary [https://perma.cc/JL9G-KRSS] (last visited Dec. 4, 2020); 18 Types of Social Posts to
Keep Your Followers Interested, INFLUENCER MKTG. HUB (Jan. 11, 2019), https://influencermarketinghub.com/18-types-of-social-posts-to-keep-your-followers-interested/ [https://perma.cc/498LM85P].
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unlimited reach.38 This has provided an avenue for people who are not
movie stars or professional athletes to do paid endorsement work with
brands.
Influencer marketing eventually found its way to every social
media platform, with Facebook-owned Instagram leading the way.39
Even newer platforms, like TikTok, are starting to see more
promotional activity from influencers and brands.40 Reports estimate
that one-third of US social media users ages sixteen to thirty-four, or
25.5 million people, are social media content creators with a following
that would allow them to be considered “influencers.”41 Over 1.5 million
of these individuals have already had a paid brand partnership.42
III. CURRENT REGULATION OF INFLUENCER MARKETING
In the early years of social media, influencer marketing was
perceived as a win-win for brands and social media users. Brands found
new ways to reach consumers and consumers received relevant brand
messaging. Additionally, influencers could make income and even
become famous in their own right. Eventually, however, the law caught
up to social media marketing and, in particular, influencer activity.
In the past few years, there have been numerous examples of
investigations, warning letters, complaints, and lawsuits based on
social media influencer activity.43
38.
See Tim Peterson, ‘The Barrier to Entry Is Zero’: Confessions of a Social Marketing
Exec on the Crowded Influencer Marketing Market, DIGIDAY (July 19, 2018), https://digiday.com/marketing/barrier-entry-zero-confessions-social-marketing-exec-crowded-influencermarketing-market/ [https://perma.cc/CR53-RXYD]; Erika Montgomery, How to Find and Evaluate
Social Media Influencers, THREE GIRLS MEDIA, INC. (July 19, 2019), https://www.threegirlsmedia.com/2019/07/19/how-to-find-and-evaluate-social-media-influencers/ [https://perma.cc/W8ACTG35].
39.
See Lieber, supra note 4; Angela Hausman, The Rise and Fall of the Social Media
Influencer, MKTG. INSIDER GRP. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://marketinginsidergroup.com/influencermarketing/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-social-media-influencer/ [https://perma.cc/9VBC-JTQX].
40.
See Liz Flora, TikTok Livestreaming Attracts Beauty Brands, GLOSSY (June 16, 2020),
https://www.glossy.co/beauty/tiktok-livestreaming-attracts-beauty-brands?utm_source=digiday.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=digidaydis&utm_content=digidayap-exploremore-glossy [https://perma.cc/8C3V-LWRE].
41.
PSFK & CISCO, CONSUMER 2020: CREATING A NEW GENERATION OF RETAIL AND
EXPERIENCE STRATEGIES 6 (2017), https://www.slideshare.net/PSFK/consumer-2020-77269097
[https://perma.cc/9DBZ-NRCZ].
42.
Id.
43.
See, e.g., FTC Staff Reminds Influencers and Brands to Clearly Disclose Relationship,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/04/ftcstaff-reminds-influencers-brands-clearly-disclose [https://perma.cc/94JA-T7T9]; Letter from
Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir. for Advert. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n, on Cole Haan, FTC
File No. 142-3041 to Christie Thompson (Mar. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Cole Haan
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Social media, and in particular influencer marketing, has proven
difficult to regulate. There is not an individual source of law applicable
to influencer marketing, and the existing laws were created long
before the advent of today’s social media platforms. Brands and their
influencers—typically lay individuals without any formal legal
training—were suddenly expected to navigate a web of advertising,
endorsement, promotion, contract, and intellectual property laws
and regulations—many of which do not adequately address the
practicalities of social media.44 This has been further complicated by the
fact that social media is constantly evolving and rules are irregularly
enforced. New platforms are frequently introduced while existing
platforms introduce novel functionalities, and influencers, brands, and
regulators all have to evaluate these changes in real time. For example,
as soon as the FTC begins to get comfortable with Instagram, brands
start engaging with influencers on TikTok.45
Despite the aforementioned challenges, the FTC has been
actively cracking down on influencer activity. Recently, the agency
has initiated enforcement actions against influencer marketers.46
The FTC’s enforcement actions against influencer marketing have
traditionally analogized paid social media content to “endorsements.”47
As such, the FTC primarily uses the 2009 Endorsement Guides as
the framework for lawful influencer marketing.48 The Endorsement
Guides were first issued in 1975 and were applied to endorsements
in traditional media.49 In 2009, the Endorsement Guides were
substantially updated for the internet age to address online reviews and

Letter], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/closing_letters/cole-haan-inc./140320colehaan
closingletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYN9-QWBN]; Lord & Taylor, LLC, No. C-4576, at *1–3 (F.T.C.
May 20, 2016) (complaint); Lesley Fair, FTC’s Teami Case: Spilling the Tea About Influencers and
Advertisers, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 6, 2020, 11:22 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2020/03/ftcs-teami-case-spilling-tea-about-influencers-advertisers
[https://perma.cc/Q422-8CPZ]; CSGO Lotto Owners Settle FTC’s First-Ever Complaint Against
Individual Social Media Influencers, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 7, 2017) [hereinafter CSGO Lotto
Owners Settle], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/09/csgo-lotto-owners-settleftcs-first-ever-complaint-against [https://perma.cc/7KD6-EYTJ].
44.
See Enforcement, supra note 11; Andrew Contiguglia, Top 5 Legal Concerns for
Influencers on Social Media, CONTIGUGLIA L. FIRM: BLOG (June 17, 2020), https://contiguglia.com/blog/legal-concerns-for-influencers-on-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/REL4-DE4G].
45.
See, e.g., Flora, supra note 40.
46.
See Lesley Fair, Three FTC Actions of Interest to Influencers, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Sept. 7, 2017, 11:11 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/09/three-ftcactions-interest-influencers [https://perma.cc/BK94-LU5Z].
47.
See The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking, supra note 11.
48.
See id.
49.
Rosch, supra note 21.
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bloggers.50 During the early years of social media influencer marketing,
the FTC applied the blogging provisions of the Endorsement Guides to
social media.51 This position was confirmed and bolstered by the
FTC’s recent 2019 guidance document, which specifically applied the
Endorsement Guides to social media influencers and reiterated the
need for “clear and conspicuous” disclosures.52
The Endorsement Guides (and other FTC guidance documents
on the subject) are not binding law; they are merely guidance to help
social marketers avoid violating the FTC’s general Section 5 “deceptive
practices” authority.53 Thus, violating the Endorsement Guides is not
per se illegal, but violations are pursued by the FTC as deceptive
practices.54 Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the FTC the authority to
enforce Congress’s prohibition against deceptive business practices.55
To show that a defendant has acted with deception in violation of
Section 5, the FTC must establish three elements: (1) there was a
material representation, omission, or practice; (2) the representation,
omission, or practice was likely to mislead consumers; and (3) the
consumers were acting reasonably under the circumstances.56 The
50.
See FTC Publishes Final Guides Governing Endorsements, Testimonials, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Oct. 5, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/10/ftc-publishes-finalguides-governing-endorsements-testimonials [https://perma.cc/B279-DMJW].
51.
See Gregory A. Nylen, Social Media Influencers as Endorsers: Pitfalls and Best
Practices to Avoid the Ire of the FTC, ORANGE CNTY. LAW., Apr. 2020, at 37, 38.
52.
16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2020); FTC Releases Advertising Disclosures Guidance for Online
Influencers, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/11/ftc-releases-advertising-disclosures-guidance-online-influencers [https://perma.cc/
9MDU-22RV]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS 2
(2019) [hereinafter DISCLOSURES 101], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/1001a-influencer-guide-508_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3DQ-4ZLZ].
53.
See The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking, supra note 11. Congress
originally created the agency to enforce the antitrust laws through the FTC Act of 1914 but later
added consumer protection issues to its portfolio in 1938 when Congress expanded the agency’s
authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act to prohibit “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” See
Robert Freer, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address Before the Annual Convention of
the Proprietary Association: The Wheeler-Lea Act (May 17, 1938); see also FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
54.
16 C.F.R. § 255.0 (2020). “Deceptive” practices are defined in the Commission’s Policy
Statement on Deception as involving a material representation, omission, or practice that is likely
to mislead a consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances. Letter from James C. Miller III,
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Hon. John D. Dingell, Chairman, House Comm.
on Energy & Com. (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ67-BDPD]. An act or practice is
“unfair” if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers
or to competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
55.
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2).
56.
See, e.g., FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 124 F. Supp. 2d 193, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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guidance documents have instructed and governed social media
marketing for the last ten years, and the FTC has become adept in
applying the guidance documents in enforcement actions targeting the
influencer marketing industry.57
As violations of the Endorsement Guides are pursued under
the FTC’s general Section 5 enforcement, the FTC’s enforcement
attempts typically proceed in three stages: (1) inquiry and
investigation; (2) consent order; and (3) if necessary, an administrative
or judicial proceeding.58 Any FTC investigation originates from a
government request, a public complaint, or through the FTC’s
own monitoring processes.59 The FTC may then initiate either an
informal inquiry to explore the veracity and severity of the potential
infraction, or instead move directly to a formal investigation.60 At this
stage, the FTC seeks information by issuing informal requests or
compulsory process, such as subpoenas and civil investigative demands
(CIDs).61 Target companies may or may not be notified of the FTC’s
investigation.62
If the FTC concludes that the target company violated certain
regulations, it will then move to the second stage. During the second
stage, the FTC usually issues written notifications to the company,
which include a draft complaint and a proposed consent order.63 The
consent order provides the target company with an opportunity to settle
the charges before the FTC files the complaint and without an
admission of liability.64 Settlement terms in the consent order vary from
case to case, but they typically include FTC monitoring for up to

57.
The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking, supra note 11; see, e.g.,
sources cited supra note 43.
58.
See FTC Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, supra note 9.
The FTC can opt to pursue either an administrative adjudication or judicial enforcement when
bringing a Section 5 enforcement action. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(b), 53(a)–(b). Administrative
adjudication provides advantages to the FTC and thus “the FTC typically opts for the
administrative process, particularly when faced with unique, fact-driven cases.” See Timothy E.
Deal, Note, Moving Beyond “Reasonable”: Clarifying the FTC’s Use of Its Unfairness Authority in
Data Security Enforcement Actions, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2227, 2237 (2016).
59.
See Mark Eichorn, If the FTC Comes to Call, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 20,
2015, 10:51 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2015/05/if-ftc-comes-call
[https://perma.cc/9UTB-KKF4].
60.
See id.
61.
See 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1(c)(1).
62.
See id.
63.
See 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.31–2.34 (2020); FTC Investigative, Law Enforcement, and
Rulemaking Authority, supra note 9; see, e.g., Turn Inc., No. 152 3099, at *2–3 (F.T.C. Dec. 20,
2016) (decision and order).
64.
FTC Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, supra note 9.
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twenty years and a ban on future similar misconduct.65 The FTC
cannot administratively impose civil penalties for violations of the
Endorsement Guides under general Section 5 “deceptive practices”
authority but may for violations of consent orders, FTC rules, or court
orders.66
Judicial and administrative proceedings, the third stage, occur
when the company declines to settle the complaint by consent order.67
At this point, the FTC may seek injunctions, civil penalties in specific
cases, and other damages.68 Most enforcement actions for influencer
marketing in violation of the Endorsement Guides are resolved by
consent order, with the brand, agency, or influencer agreeing to
monitoring and compliance without substantial civil or criminal
penalties.69 For first-time offenders, this typically means that monetary
penalties can be avoided.70
Under the Endorsement Guides, the FTC takes the position that
primary compliance responsibility rests with the brand sponsoring the
message or post.71 It is the brand’s duty to ensure influencers utilize
proper notices, despite the fact that the influencer is the one posting the
content on his or her personal page.72 Brands and influencers often
struggle with the Endorsement Guides because the mandates are often
at odds with the desires of modern marketing departments and the
realities of social media.73 Brands increasingly value authenticity
and strive for “grassroots” campaigns.74 Under the FTC’s guidelines,
65.
See, e.g., GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. 94, 123–32 (1999) (decision and order); BJ’s Wholesale
Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 470–72 (2005) (decision and order); Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade
Commission and Privacy: Defining Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices,
48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 834 (2011); Deal, supra note 58, at 2240; Gerard M.
Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and Data Security: The FTC’s Hidden
Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 690–91 (2013).
66.
Advertisement Endorsements, supra note 9; 15 U.S.C. § 45(m); Stegmaier & Bartnick,
supra note 65.
67.
FTC Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, supra note 9.
68.
See 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b); FTC Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking
Authority, supra note 9.
69.
See Laura E. Bladow, Note, Worth the Click: Why Greater FTC Enforcement Is Needed
to Curtail Deceptive Practices in Influencer Marketing, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1153–54,
1159–60 (2018).
70.
See Veronica N. Ramirez, Note, Fashion Statements Turned Endorsements: How FTC
Enforcement Could Cripple the Internet’s Trendsetters, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 483, 492 (2018).
71.
See 16 C.F.R. § 255.1 (2020).
72.
See 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2020).
73.
See Squire Patton Boggs, Spreading the Influence: FTC Issues New Guidance for
Influencers, LEXOLOGY: GLOB. BUS. IP & TECH. BLOG (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=97d0a0bf-f4ec-41fb-95f8-e6487e3c3e5b [https://perma.cc/WKN7-WUEJ].
74.
See Pamela N. Danziger, How Retailers Big and Small Can Activate Grassroots
Influencers on Social Media, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2019, 11:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
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however, influencers must disclose—within the post itself—when they
are paid for a post or receive a product for free or at a discounted price,
regardless of whether the influencer would have felt the same way if
the product was purchased by the individual.75 Further, a specific
social media platform’s functionality may make appropriate disclosure
difficult or impossible. This was evident with Twitter’s character
limits—only so much disclosure is possible in Twitter’s original
140-character limit. The FTC reacted to this issue by recommending
influencers include #Ad or #Sponsored in the post—much to the disdain
of creatives everywhere.76 Even these simple recommendations can be
difficult in practice, however, as brands must find a way to control their
numerous influencers across various platforms, who are sometimes
unaware of the FTC’s guidelines or even that they are making an
“endorsement.”77
This was the case when the FTC admonished Cole Haan, a
footwear purveyor, for soliciting Pinterest “endorsements” from the
general public without satisfactory disclosures.78 Cole Haan ran a
promotion on Pinterest in which the contest rules instructed entrants
to create Pinterest boards that included images of Cole Haan shoes and
used the hashtag “#WanderingSole” in each pin description for a
chance to win a $1,000 shopping spree.79 These posts did not come from
influencers as the classification is typically understood but rather
individual consumers trying to win a contest.80 Despite this, the FTC
took the position that “participants’ pins featuring Cole Haan products
were endorsements of the Cole Haan products, and the fact that the
pins were incentivized by the opportunity to win a $1,000 shopping
spree would not reasonably be expected by consumers who saw the
pins,” and thus, the posts were all deceptive endorsements.81
Since this was an issue of first impression for the FTC, the
FTC decided not to pursue an enforcement action against Cole
Haan but rather stated that it expects “that Cole Haan will take
reasonable steps to monitor social media influencers’ compliance with
pamdanziger/2019/03/06/how-retailers-big-and-small-can-activate-grassroots-influencers-on-social-media/#7ae58af96309 [https://perma.cc/ACA3-AW8V] (defining grassroots influencers as “real
people sharing their real-world experiences with a retailer or a brand”); Francesca Nicasio, The
Age of Authentic Marketing: A Guide to Gain Consumer Trust, POWER REVS., https://www.powerreviews.com/blog/authentic-marketing/ [https://perma.cc/Y5JE-B2W7] (last visited Dec. 6, 2020).
75.
See Boggs, supra note 73.
76.
See id.
77.
See, e.g., infra Part III (discussing the Lord & Taylor campaign).
78.
See Cole Haan Letter, supra note 43.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
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the obligation to disclose material connections when endorsing its
products” and ultimately “reserve[d] the right to take further action as
the public interest may warrant.”82
Similarly, in 2016, the FTC censured clothing retailer
Lord & Taylor for paying fifty fashion influencers to post Instagram
pictures of themselves wearing the same dress but failing to ensure that
the compensation and the resulting “material connection”83 were
disclosed to the influencers’ followers.84 The campaign was ultimately
very successful—the dress sold out on the strength of the campaign’s
reach to 11.4 million Instagram users, which, in turn, resulted in over
320,000 unique brand engagements or interactions with consumers
and potential consumers.85 The FTC was displeased with the lack
of disclosures and held Lord & Taylor responsible.86 Lord & Taylor
ultimately settled the matter, and the FTC issued an enforcement
policy statement.87 The statement confirmed the FTC’s position that:
an ad’s format is deceptive if it materially misleads consumers about the ad’s
commercial nature, including through any implied or express representation that it
comes from a party other than the sponsoring advertiser. If the source of advertising
content is clear, consumers can make informed decisions about whether to interact
with the advertising and the weight to give the information conveyed in the ad. 88

More recently, the FTC settled another case with Teami, LLC, a
purveyor of health- and beauty-focused tea products.89 The FTC’s initial
complaint alleged that Teami made misleading claims about the weight
loss and health benefits of its products, in addition to paying influencers
for endorsements that were not properly disclosed.90 The Commission
had previously demanded Teami’s advertisements maintain disclosures

82.
Id.
83.
DISCLOSURES 101, supra note 52 (“A ‘material connection’ to the brand includes a
personal, family, or employment relationship or a financial relationship – such as the brand paying
you or giving you free or discounted products or services.”).
84.
Lord & Taylor, LLC, No. C-4576, at *1–3 (F.T.C. May 20, 2016) (complaint).
85.
Lord & Taylor Settles FTC Charges It Deceived Consumers Through Paid Article in an
Online Fashion Magazine and Paid Instagram Posts by 50 “Fashion Influencers,” FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/03/lord-taylor-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-through [https://perma.cc/MP4S-AM8J].
86.
See id.
87.
Id.
88.
FTC Issues Enforcement Policy Statement Addressing “Native” Advertising
and Deceptively Formatted Advertisements, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 22, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/ftc-issues-enforcement-policy-statementaddressing-native [https://perma.cc/TP49-QC2A].
89.
Fair, supra note 43.
90.
Id.; see also Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 17,
FTC v. Teami, LLC, No. 8:20-cv-00518 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2020) [hereinafter Teami Complaint].
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that are “clear and conspicuous.”91 The FTC maintained that
disclosures require unambiguous language that can be easily noticed
and understood by consumers.92 The FTC also noted a particular
characteristic of Instagram: users typically only see the first few lines
unless they click “more.”93 To prevent obscuring the disclosures, the
FTC required endorsers to disclose any material connection above the
“more” link.94
The Teami example, in particular, illustrates some of the
technical and creative difficulties in complying with the Endorsement
Guides. For Teami, disclosure itself was not enough. The disclosure had
to be “above the fold” as specifically applied to Instagram posts.95
Furthermore, modern social media platforms emphasize video and
livestreaming over text. How would this “above the fold” requirement
apply to livestreaming? It is difficult to translate the “clear and
conspicuous” disclosure requirement from the Endorsement Guides’
blogging examples to modern, video-centric platforms like TikTok and
Twitch.96 While those platforms offer functionalities like text overlay,
which would allow for certain disclosures, the FTC has shown that
it takes a very nuanced approach to the “clear and conspicuous”
requirements for disclosures, yet it has not provided clear and
specific requirements for disclosures in such contexts. What’s more,
there has recently been a surge in popularity of content-sharing
platforms that require paid registration (e.g., OnlyFans).97 These
paid or registration-required sites pose additional challenges to FTC
investigation and enforcement of endorsement compliance. The FTC’s
guidelines fail to provide adequate specificity to account for the
intricacies present in contemporary social media channels and related
advertising strategies.

91.
See Fair, supra note 43.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.; see also Teami Complaint, supra note 90, at 13.
95.
See Fair, supra note 43.
96.
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 255.5, ex. 7 (2020). The website influencer examples in the
Guidelines primarily cover bloggers. See id. § 255.1, ex. 5, § 255.5, ex. 7. In the blogging examples,
the FTC simply recommends adding text to the blog post to “clearly and conspicuously disclose”
the connection. Id.
97.
See How It Works, ONLYFANS, onlyfans.com/how [https://perma.cc/5535-PEXN] (last
visited Dec. 6, 2020); see also Seren Morris, What Is OnlyFans, Who Uses It and How Does It Work?,
NEWSWEEK (July 23, 2020, 11:47 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/what-who-how-only-fans-social-media-platform-content-creators-1520001 [https://perma.cc/H344-NBUN].
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IV. PROPOSED EXPANSION OF REGULATION AND PENALTIES
Despite the difficulties and limitations of the current regulatory
framework, its application over the last decade has allowed brands
and influencers to anticipate how the rules will be enforced and the
potential risks of noncompliance. However, shortly after the ten-year
anniversary of the modern Endorsement Guides, the FTC released
a proposal to enhance its enforcement and penalty capabilities in
connection with influencer marketing.98 In February 2020, the FTC
requested public comment on proposals to strengthen the FTC’s
regulation of influencer marketing.99 As stated in FTC Commissioner
Rohit Chopra’s proposal, the FTC is concerned that “[m]isinformation
is plaguing the digital economy, and recent no-money, no-fault FTC
settlements with well-known retailers and brands to address fake
reviews and undisclosed influencer endorsements may be doing little to
deter deception.”100
Based on this concern, the FTC is pursuing the ability to
seek civil penalties for violations of the FTC’s Endorsement Guides.101
Specifically, Commissioner Chopra is considering creating formal rules
based on the requirements in the Endorsement Guides, which would
provide the FTC with more punitive actions for violations.102 The
FTC is also seeking to specify “the requirement that companies must
adhere to in their contractual arrangements with influencers, including
through sample terms that companies can include in contracts.”103
On one hand, the federal government, specifically the FTC and
other government agencies, plays an important role in protecting
consumers and prohibiting malicious and clearly deceptive marketing
in US commerce.104 But with respect to influencer marketing,
Commissioner Chopra is concerned that the nonbinding guidelines do
not go far enough to protect consumers and has instead proposed

98.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 3.
99.
Id.
100.
Id. at 1.
101.
Id. at 3.
102.
Id.
103.
Id.
104.
See FTC Wins $5.2 Million Judgment Against Defendants Who Tricked Consumers
with Ads for Non-Existent Rental Properties and ‘Free’ Credit Reports, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July
5, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/07/ftc-wins-52-million-judgmentagainst-defendants-who-tricked [https://perma.cc/LML8-AKNN]; see also Lesley Fair, Violating
Made in USA Order Lands Filtration Seller in Hot Water, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 17, 2020,
11:51 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2019/04/violating-made-usa-order-lands-filtration-seller-hot-water [https://perma.cc/N647-625B].
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harsher penalties under the FTC Act for actual rules violations.105
Thus, Commissioner Chopra desires to “codify[] elements of the existing
endorsement guides into formal rules so that violators can be liable for
civil penalties under Section 5(m)(1)(A) and liable for damages under
Section 19” instead of relying on the general Section 5 deceptive
practices authority, which typically results in settlements and consent
orders without admission of liability.106 Yet, for the reasons discussed
in this Article,107 the FTC’s proposal to move “beyond the issuance of
voluntary guidance”108 to instead issue formal rules and seek civil
penalties for violations is unwarranted and may have unintended
consequences.
As this Article discusses in Part V, it is more appropriate for the
FTC to continue recommending and enforcing best practices through
the Endorsement Guides and other guidance documents while
minimizing penalties. This approach would allow brands and
influencers to continue innovating influencer marketing and increase
information and content available to consumers. The FTC’s current
enforcement of the Endorsement Guides is sufficiently capable of
protecting consumers while allowing the flexibility required for
innovative technology like social media.
V. ADEQUATE CONSUMER PROTECTION EXISTS WITHOUT FORMAL
RULEMAKING AND CIVIL PENALTIES
The FTC Endorsement Guides call for honest and representative
statements that are able to be substantiated while barring deceptive or
misleading claims.109 Specifically, the Endorsement Guides require
that:
(i)
endorsements reflect the actual opinions or experiences
of the endorser;110
(ii)
endorsements may not contain any representations that
would be deceptive, or could not be substantiated, if made
directly by the advertiser;111
(iii)
an advertisement employing a consumer endorsement
on a central or key attribute of a product will be
105.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 3; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A), 57b.
106.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 3; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A), 57b; see also
discussion infra Parts V, VI.
107.
See discussion supra Part IV; discussion infra Part V.
108.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 3.
109.
16 C.F.R. § 255 (2020).
110.
Id. § 255.1(a).
111.
Id.
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interpreted as representing that the endorser’s
experience is representative of what consumers will
generally achieve;112
(iv)
advertisements represented as consumer endorsements
must cite actual consumers or conspicuously disclose that
the persons are not actual consumers;113
(v)
endorsements must clearly disclose any connection
between the endorser and the brand owner “that might
materially affect the weight or credibility of the
endorsement.”114
These requirements may appear straightforward. This was the
case when they were applied to traditional media or even bloggers.
However, these requirements can be difficult to implement in the
context of social media. Specifically, Provision (v), which requires
parties to fully disclose their connections, creates complications
for many brands and influencers.115 This requirement is the most
ambiguous and difficult to understand in the entire social media
industry.
Over the last several years, enforcement of Provision (v) has
taken several shapes, from the Cole Haan endorsement sweepstakes116
and the Lord & Taylor grassroots campaign117 mentioned in Part III,118
to issues with employees119 and owners120 posting about their companies
and products without disclosures. The variety in these enforcement
actions (all based on the same requirement) illustrates that both
brands and the FTC must continually evolve their understanding of
this requirement. As technology and consumer behavior change, these
enforcements should serve as an example of why rigid laws with harsh
penalties would be ineffective in an ever-changing and evolving
industry.

112.
Id. § 255.2(a) (stating that if an advertiser does not have adequate substantiation that
the endorser’s experience is representative, the advertisement should contain a clear and
conspicuous disclosure).
113.
Id. § 255.2(c).
114.
Id. § 255.5.
115.
Id.
116.
Cole Haan Letter, supra note 43.
117.
Lord & Taylor, LLC, No. C-4576, at *3 (F.T.C. May 20, 2016) (complaint).
118.
See discussion supra Part III.
119.
FTC Approves Final Orders Related to False Advertising by Sony Computer
Entertainment America and Its Ad Agency Deutsch LA for PS Vita Game Console, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/03/ftc-approves-final-orders-related-false-advertising-sony-computer [https://perma.cc/796Q-HXG4].
120.
CSGO Lotto Owners Settle, supra note 43.

2021]

REGULATION OF INFLUENCER MARKETING

271

A. Social Media’s Rapid Evolution Requires a Flexible Approach
Given the rapid evolution of social media, the flexibility in the
current regulatory scheme, along with nominal penalties, is necessary.
The FTC addressed this in The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People
Are Asking guidance document from 2017.121 In this document, the
FTC attempted to clarify many of the questions that arose as people
tried to apply the Endorsement Guides to then-innovative social
media platforms like Twitter and Snapchat.122 The FTC clarified that
influencers only need to sacrifice three characters (#ad) on Twitter
and that users need to “superimpose a disclosure on Snapchat” while
considering “how well [the disclosure] contrasts against the image.”123
These answers are sufficient (to some extent) for platforms that existed
in 2017, but what about when new platforms arrive? Who is responsible
for the appropriate disclosures in a TikTok response video (known as a
“duet”)?124 What about OnlyFans or augmented reality platforms? It
is difficult to predict where social media will go in the future, which
emphasizes the need for flexibility in the rules governing this space.
There is also an element of self-regulation already built into
social media marketing, as influencers will often hear from their
followers if they perceive the influencer to be pushing too much paid
and branded content.125 Considering the “harm” to consumers (or lack
thereof) for failure to disclose the material connection, being critiqued
by your followers seems like a sufficient punishment for most cases.
Consider the Lord & Taylor case cited by the FTC as a warranted use
of enforcement power.126 As previously discussed, the retailer paid
fifty influencers to wear the same dress and post a picture with the
company’s handle.127 The FTC charged Lord & Taylor with deceiving
the public by failing to disclose that the company compensated the
influencers for those posts.128 The FTC then settled the case for
“no customer refunds, no forfeiture of ill-gotten gains, no notice to
121.
The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking, supra note 11.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
Melanie Weir, How to Duet on TikTok and Record a Video Alongside Someone Else’s,
BUS. INSIDER (June 11, 2020, 9:10 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-duet-on-tiktok
[https://perma.cc/Z2JN-MRTE] (“When TikTok first came out, one of its biggest features was duets.
These gave you the ability to record your own video alongside someone else’s.”).
125.
Salma El-Wardany, Influencers Aren’t the Problem — They’re Just Trying to Make It
in a Broken System, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 22, 2019, 4:16 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/salmaelwardany/dont-hate-the-influencers-hate-the-game [https://perma.cc/73WK-NFRD].
126.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 3.
127.
Id. at 2.
128.
Id. at 3.
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consumers, no deletion of wrongfully obtained personal data, and no
findings or admission of liability.”129
What was the harm here to consumers—that they bought a
dress they might not have otherwise purchased? If that was the case,
would a disclosure have changed their minds? If the product itself
was defective for some reason, should that liability rest with the
manufacturer or retailer rather than with the person that made a
post about it online? If the pictures of the dress had been viewed in
the Lord & Taylor catalogue or during a commercial rather than on
Instagram, would the purchasers have made a different decision? The
influencers were clearly wearing the dress in the posts and complied
with all of the other requirements in the Endorsement Guides but just
not the final endorsement connection disclosure requirement under 16
C.F.R. § 255.5.130 Considering the lack of actual injury to customers by
the influencer—financial or otherwise—the brand’s publicity damage
paired with FTC threats is sufficient recourse. Because of the absence
of actual injury to consumers, significant monetary liability imposed by
the FTC was unnecessary.131
Commissioner Chopra argues that enhanced enforcement and
penalties are necessary because “when companies launder advertising
by paying someone for a seemingly authentic endorsement or review,
this is illegal payola.”132 However, Commissioner Chopra’s statement
also admits that “[w]hen individual influencers are able to post about
their interests to earn extra money on the side, this is not a cause for
major concern.”133 This dichotomy illustrates the lack of uniformity in
assessing influencer behavior and the difficulty in assessing blame.
Accordingly, the existing light-handed framework is a more appropriate
way to address this kind of conduct than harsh civil penalties.
B. Consumer Perception Has Evolved and Paid Content on Social
Media Is Readily Recognized
As social media platforms gained prominence, users were not
always able to tell whether an influencer was compensated for a post or
whether it was an organic endorsement.134 However, consumers have
129.
Id.
130.
Id. at 2.
131.
Id. at 3.
132.
Id. at 2.
133.
Id.
134.
Internet Experts Who Attract Paid Advertisers Run the Risk of Alienating ‘Followers,’
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://carey.jhu.edu/articles/research/internet-experts-whoattract-paid-advertisers-run-risk-alienating-followers [https://perma.cc/24JX-X8GV].
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now lived with Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram for nearly a
decade.135 Today, social media users are largely perceptive digital
consumers who are easily able to differentiate “between an advert, a
personal recommendation, and an advert masked under a personal
recommendation.”136 This suggests that consumers may not be as
misled by influencer marketing as the FTC believes.
Influencers who (1) use the products they promote; (2) provide
only truthful claims that are inherently free of deception; and
(3) disclose material facts around their use of the product (even if there
is not a clear Provision (v) connection disclosure) are arguably not
harming consumers with posts about the product. There is ample data
showing that the presence or absence of a connection between the
influencer and the brand does not materially affect the weight or
credibility of the endorsement and, therefore, does not need to
be disclosed.137 Social media users already understand trends of
social media marketing and can recognize an influencer’s post when
they see one.138 Studies have shown that a material connection
disclosure neither positively nor negatively impacts a consumer’s
perception of a brand.139 Furthermore, brands that work with
more recognized “mega-influencers” (i.e., those with 10 million
or more followers) average reduced rates of social engagement
(likes and comments on their posts).140 Experts estimate that the
135.
See Facebook Launches, HIST. (Oct. 24, 2020), https://www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/facebook-launches-mark-zuckerberg [https://perma.cc/RRD8-7JDF]; Twitter Launches,
HIST.,
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/twitter-launches
[https://perma.cc/DJ8G95SQ] (last updated July 14, 2020); Dan Blystone, The Story of Instagram: The Rise of the #1
Photo-Sharing Application, INVESTOPEDIA (June 6, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/102615/story-instagram-rise-1-photo0sharing-app.asp
[https://perma.cc/3UP4KLZZ].
136.
80 Influencer Marketing Statistics for 2020, INFLUENCER MKTG. HUB, https://influencermarketinghub.com/influencer-marketing-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/9VWA-DK9B]
(last
updated June 15, 2020).
137.
See, e.g., id.; Ana Gotter, Influencer Marketing in 2020: 5 Guidelines for Maximizing
the Results of Working with Influencers, ADESPRESSO (Feb. 11, 2020), https://adespresso.com/
blog/influencer-marketing-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/F29M-3ZVQ]; Robert Williams, Social
Media Users Trust Fellow Consumers More than Brands, Study Finds, MOBILE MARKETER (Apr.
18, 2019), https://www.mobilemarketer.com/news/social-media-users-trust-fellow-consumersmore-than-brands-study-finds/552994/ [https://perma.cc/JS7S-3RMS].
138.
See 80 Influencer Marketing Statistics for 2020, supra note 136.
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Getting Paid?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 29, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/08/do-influencers-need-totell-audiences-theyre-getting-paid [https://perma.cc/56SV-RWEM].
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Micro Influencer Marketing 101: Why Bigger Isn’t Always Better, SWAY GRP.
https://blog.swaygroup.com/micro-influencer [https://perma.cc/2L9C-FETZ] (last visited Dec. 6,
2020); 80 Influencer Marketing Statistics for 2020, supra note 136; Audrezet & Charry, supra note
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“mega-influencers” get “tuned out the same way we skip commercials
or other traditional advertising.”141 This evidence illustrates that the
“material connection” between the brand and influencer is unlikely
to materially affect the weight of an endorsement in the minds of
consumers, and even if it does have an effect, it is likely to be negative.
In fact, creating laws that come with steep civil penalties for
marketing activities in the ever-changing social media ecosystem could
be interpreted as a direct violation of the FTC’s mission to act “without
unduly burdening legitimate business activity.”142 Some studies have
found that influencer marketing is actually beneficial to consumers,
with one citing that “over 50% of [social media] users prefer getting
product information from influencers and other users rather than
straight from brands or advertising.”143 There is also evidence that
“regulation is bad for followers, who suffer from the decline in the
quality of advice.144 The regulation is bad for marketers, who observe
lower levels of engagement with their paid content, and it is bad for
influencers, who receive lower pay from marketers.”145
Today’s consumers are accustomed to and prepared for paid
content from many sources, even if disclosures are not present. For
example, consumers frequently see paid “product placement,” the act
of embedding and displaying products or brands, in television and
movies.146 The FTC has taken the position that product placement in
entertainment content is different from sponsored content and “doesn’t
require a disclosure that the advertiser paid for the placement.”147 In
2015, a study reported that an estimated 85 percent of people watching
a television show notice and recognize product placement.148 As with
product placement in movies or television, the vast majority of social
media users also understand when a product is being endorsed and only
follow a specific influencer because they “‘just like looking at their posts’
141.
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142.
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prevent “anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices through law enforcement,
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while only 29% said they have made a purchase based on an influencer
post.”149 Does the FTC really believe that consumers are capable of
identifying product placement in film and television but not on social
media? Is Instagram not largely “entertainment content” like film
and television?150 The amount of time users are spending on such
apps would suggest that it is entertainment content.151 It would be
inconsistent to treat product placement in movies and television
differently from an influencer’s creative and heavily curated Instagram
page. In fact, the FTC partially makes the argument against forced
disclosure under this analogy in the agency’s provided Example 2 to
Section 255.5 of the Endorsement Guides.152
Example 2: A film star endorses a particular food product. The endorsement regards
only points of taste and individual preference. This endorsement must, of course,
comply with § 255.1; but regardless of whether the star’s compensation for the
commercial is a $1 million cash payment or a royalty for each product sold by the
advertiser during the next year, no disclosure is required because such payments
likely are ordinarily expected by viewers.153

As traditional modes of advertising lose effectiveness, paid social
media content is becoming the new norm. Consumers know and expect
to see these posts. In the words of the FTC example above, influencers’
endorsements are “ordinarily expected by viewers.”154
Furthermore, even if consumers do not initially recognize paid
content, there are many sources of product reviews and product
information freely available online from which consumers can quickly
and easily get a second opinion before any purchase.155 In these
scenarios, consumers not only recognize paid content but there is also
evidence that the required disclosures are beginning to disrupt the
social media experience, causing what has been called “influencer
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fatigue.”156 This fatigue erodes the trust that consumers have in
influencers. In 2019, it was reported that “only 4% of people believe that
information shared by influencers on social media is true.”157 Not
only does this demonstrate that consumers are keenly aware that social
media includes paid content but it also shows that consumers are
not substantially influenced by influencer posts. Instead, the required
disclosures and disclaimers have disrupted the social media experience
for many users. Civil liabilities and additional mandated disclosures
under Section 255.5 would likely exacerbate influencer fatigue.
The Harvard Business Review has expressly stated that “in any
particular year, disclosure makes almost no difference to the impact
of the influencer’s recommendation on the purchase decision.”158 In
essence, most social media users are going to believe what they want to
believe, and the presence or absence of a mandated disclosure likely
does little to change this fact.
This evidence refutes some of the primary reasoning in the
Commissioner’s statement for harsher penalties.159 In the February
12, 2020, statement, Commissioner Chopra argues for increased
accountability by stating that “[f]ake accounts, fake likes, fake
followers, and fake reviews are now polluting the digital economy,
making it difficult for families and small businesses looking for truthful
information.”160 But if influencers genuinely like the products they are
paid to post and modern consumers are not particularly swayed by
influencer content, can easily compare reviews and obtain second
opinions online, and buy things they think they will like, does
the absence of a material connection disclosure really “pollute the
digital economy?” With mounting evidence showing the limited effect
influencer disclosures have on consumer decision-making, along with
the growing expectation of social media users that influencer posts are
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sponsored, the FTC’s proposal for enhanced enforcement and penalties
is both belated and unnecessary.161
VI. CONCLUSION
Social media influencer advertising provides a new means for
brands to reach consumers in the modern era. As consumers become
more aware of this practice, some might be annoyed by paid content
while others may appreciate the targeted recommendations. Yet, very
few consumers are tricked or manipulated by such content and even
fewer are substantially damaged by it.
While the existing regulatory framework for influencer
marketing is not perfect, its light-handed, flexible approach allows
for brands and influencers to participate without fear of substantial
penalties. If the FTC enhances the potential penalties, as proposed in
Commissioner Chopra’s February 12, 2020, statement, the risks will
substantially outweigh the rewards and this novel and, at times, useful
form of advertising may cease to exist. Influencers will slowly become
extinct due to burdensome regulatory schemes and increased liability.
As traditional forms of advertising decline, consumers will suffer from
a lack of brand and product knowledge, brands will suffer from a lack
of exposure, and social media users will lose a valuable revenue stream.
The FTC occasionally reevaluates its rules and considers revising them
to apply to the modern construct.162 Here, perhaps a reevaluation is
appropriate, but the goal should be to simplify the regulations and ease
potential penalties rather than to enhance enforcement as was recently
proposed by the FTC.
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